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UNITED STA TES EX REL. STATE OF WISCONSIN V.
DEAN: A REQUEST FOR AN AMENDMENT TO
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
INTRODUCTION
In United States ex rel. State of Wisconsin v. Dean,' the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals refused to allow the State of Wisconsin to recover under the False
Claims Act (FCA)2 for fraudulent medicare claims which a psychiatrist had sub-
mitted to Wisconsin and the Federal Government.' The court adopted a restric-
tive interpretation of the FCA's jurisdictional bar and found that Wisconsin fit
within the jurisdictional bar.4 As a result, the Seventh Circuit frustrated the legis-
lative intent of the FCA, ignored recent Supreme Court decisions, and disre-
garded Wisconsin's statutory obligation under federal medicare law. The Dean
court did suggest, however, that Wisconsin petition Congress for an exemption to
the jurisdictional bar.5
This comment analyzes the Dean opinion in light of the legislative intent of
both the FCA and its subsequently-enacted jurisdictional bar. It also examines
recent case law and the underlying public policy considerations weighed by the
courts and the legislature. Finally, this comment considers a Congressional ex-
emption to the jurisdictional bar.
UNITED STA TES EX REL. STATE OF WISCONSIN V. DEAN
The appellant in Dean, Alice R. Dean, was a Milwaukee psychiatrist.6 In
1980, a state court found Dean guilty of making fraudulent claims for Medicaid
reimbursements. 7 It sentenced her to probation and ordered her to pay $13,285 in
restitution to the State of Wisconsin.' The State consequently revoked Dean's
license to practice medicine in Wisconsin.9
On September 9, 1980, the State of Wisconsin's Department of Justice and
Department of Health and Social Services filed suit against Alice R. Dean in fed-
eral district court.' ° The departments sued under the FCA" - a civil statute
designed to protect the United States government from fraudulent claims. 12 The
FCA provides:
Any person . . . who shall . . . cause to be presented, for payment or
approval. . . any claim upon or against. . . the United States. . . knowing
1. 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984).
2. The False Claims Act, which is codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-233, 235 (1976), allows the United States
government and private parties who qualify under the Act to recover for fraudulent claims submitted
to the government.
3. 729 F.2d at 1102. The jurisdictional bar (31 U.S.C. § 232(C)) denies jurisdiction where the suit is
based upon evidence or information in the possession of the United States government at the time the
suit was brought.
4. Id. at 1107.
5. Id. at 1106.





11. 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-233, 235 (1976).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968). See also infra note 14.
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such claim to be false, ficticious, or fraudulent shall forfeit and pay to the
United States the sum of $2,000, and, in addition, double the amount of dam-
ages which the United States may have sustained by reason of doing or com-
mitting such act .... 13
In addition to allowing the federal government to recover, the FCA gives private
parties both a cause of action against persons who submit false claims to the fed-
eral government 14 and a portion of any recovery. 5 In Dean, Wisconsin brought
suit as a private party under the FCA.16
Dean argued that the FCA's jurisdictional bar clause deprived the federal dis-
trict court of jurisdiction.17 The jurisdictional bar clause provides:
[T]he court shall have no jurisdiction. . . whenever it shall be made to appear
that such suit was based upon evidence or information in the possession of the
United States, or any agency, officer, or employee thereof, at the time such suit
was brought.'"
Although the district court found that the suit was based on information in the
possession of the United States, it held that this case was not within the FCA's
jurisdictional bar.19 The court cited both the FCA's legislative history and subse-
quent case law to support its holding.2° The court also sympathized with Wiscon-
sin since federal Medicaid law21 required Wisconsin to turn the information over
to the United States.22 Because of the Medicaid law, the United States acquired
the information before Wisconsin brought the suit, thereby appearing to place
13. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976).
14. 31 U.S.C. § 232(B) (1976) provides:
Such suit may be brought and carried on by any person, as well for himself as for the United
States, the same shall be at the sole cost and charge of such person, and shall be in the name of
the United States, but shall not be withdrawn or discontinued without the consent, in writing,
of the judge of the court and the United States attorney, first filed in the case, setting forth their
reasons for such consent.
The private plaintiff must also follow the procedures specified in § 232(C):
(1) serve the United States Attorney General with a copy of the complaint; (2) include a disclosure in
writing of substantially all evidence and information in his possession material to the effective prosecu-
tion of the suit; (3) wait 60 days to allow the United States to decide whether to enter an appearance.
If the United States declines to join, the plaintiff may maintain the action unless the suit was based
upon information in the possession of the United States at the time such suit was brought.
In Dean, Wisconsin met these specified procedures and consequently, they were not an issue in the
case.
15. When the United States joins in the suit, the private plaintiff may recover fair and reasonable compen-
sation, not to exceed one-tenth of the proceeds or settlement. 31 U.S.C. § 232(E)(1) (1976). When the
United States does not join in the suit, the private plaintiff may recover fair and reasonable compensa-
tion, not to exceed one-fourth of the proceeds or settlement. 31 U.S.C. § 232(E)(2) (1976).
16. There was no issue contesting whether the State of Wisconsin constitutes a private party under the
FCA.
17. 729 F.2d at 1103.
18. 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1976) (emphasis added).
19. 729 F.2d at 1103.
20. Id. at 1103, 1106.
21. 42 C.F.R. § 455.17 (1984). This provision requires that the state agency report Medicaid fraud and
abuse information to the Regional Health Care Financing Administration Administrator as follows:
(a) The number of complaints of fraud and abuse made to the agency that warrant preliminary
investigation.
(b) For each case of suspected fraud and abuse that warrants a full investigation.
(1) The provider's name and number;
(2) The source of the complaint;
(3) The type of provider;
(4) The nature of the complaint;
(5) The approximate range of dollars involved; and
(6) The legal and administrative disposition of the case, including actions taken by law
enforcement officials to whom the case has been referred.
(c) A summary of the information reported in paragraph (b) of this section.
22. 729 F.2d at 1104.
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Wisconsin within the jurisdictional bar. The district court, however, recognized
Wisconsin's statutory obligation under Medicaid law, in addition to the FCA's
legislative history and subsequent case law, and found jurisdiction over the case.23
The Seventh Circuit reversed and denied Wisconsin's cause of action.24 Apply-
ing a strict, literal interpretation of the FCA, the court held that the district court
lacked jurisdiction because the suit was based on evidence or information in the
possession of the United States.25 As a result, the Seventh Circuit frustrated the
legislative intent behind the FCA, did not consider recent Supreme Court deci-
sions, and disregarded Wisconsin's statutory obligation.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Congress enacted the FCA in 186326 in response to investigations that exposed
the fraudulent use of government funds during the Civil War.27 In 1943, Con-
gress enacted the jurisdictional bar provision in reaction to United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess.2 9 In Hess, the Supreme Court held that actions under the FCA
are not barred merely because the plaintiff received his information from an in-
dictment rather than from his own investigation.3° Congress disagreed with the
decision and enacted the jurisdictional bar provision to bar parasitical suits where
the plaintiff relies on information acquired from public records such as
indictments.31
Congress adopted the jurisdictional bar provision as a result of a compromise
between a House bill and a Senate bill.32 The House of Representatives passed a
bill that would have amended the FCA to abolish qui tam suits33 - suits in which
the plaintiff sues for himself and on behalf of the government to recover a portion
of the penalty allowed under a statute.34 The Senate bill, however, permitted qui
tam suits under the FCA if: (1) the suits were based upon information that was
not in the possession of the United States; or (2) the suits were based upon infor-
mation in the possession of the United States provided that the plaintiff was the
source of such information.35 The compromise bill incorporated only the first
part of the Senate proposal. 36 Accordingly, it permitted qui tam actions only if
the information was not in the possession of the United States at the time the
plaintiff brought the suit.37
Although the compromise bill did not specifically include the second part of
the Senate proposal,38 the House Conference Report shows that the compromise
bill intended to include qui tam suits where the plaintiff was the source of the
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1107.
25. Id.
26. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch.67, § 4, 12 Stat. 696.
27. See Neifert- White Co., 390 U.S. at 232 (1968).
28. Act of December 23, 1943, ch. 377, § 1, 57 Stat. 608.
29. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
30. 317 U.S. at 545-48.
31. See 89 CONG. REC. 10,846 (1943).
32. H.R. Rep. No 933, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 reprinted in 89 CONG. REC. 10, 844-45 (1943).
33. Id.
34. 729 F.2d at 1102. In Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F. 2d 581, 591 (9th Cir. 1979), the court defined a qui
tam action as a civil proceeding in which an informer sues for the government, as well as for himself,
to recover a penalty under a particular statute; statutory authority for the action must be specifically
provided. See also, Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co. 457 F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir.
1972) and Drew v. Hilliker 56 Vt. 641 (1884).
35. H.R. Rep. No. 933, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 reprinted in 89 CONG. REC. 10,845 (1943).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
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information. 39 The House Conference Report stated: [i]t will not be possible to
abate a pending suit if before such suit was filed such person had in his possession
and voluntarily disclosed to the Attorney General substantial evidence or infor-
mation which was not theretofore in the possession of the Department of Jus-
tice. 4° The House Conference Report shows that as part of the compromise, the
House accepted the second part of the Senate bill which includes qui tam suits if
the plaintiff was the source of the essential information and the government did
not yet have such information in its possession.
Representative Francis Walter (D-Penn.), a member of the conference com-
mittee that drafted the compromise bill, shed additional light on the legislative
intent of the provision.41 In reference to the compromise bill, he stated:
We feel by enacting this compromise legislation the United States will be am-
ply protected and at the same time there will not be this ever-present invitation
to racketeers to examine indictments, to examine reports of the Truman com-
mittee, or if you please, for dishonest and unscrupulous investigators to turn
over information to their friends or coconspirators for the purpose of bringing
suit against our citizens on information that either comes to them by reading
an indictment or bill of complaint or through testimony before some
committee.42
Representative Walter also explained that the committee had "no desire to inter-
fere with suits that are brought honestly and legitimately by informers."43 More-
over, Representative Estes Kefauver (D-Tenn.) stated: "This bill, then protects
the Government and it protects the corporation or the contractor from being de-
frauded and harassed by shysters or people who might bring suit without any
information or with little information ... ,"" The statements of Representa-
tives Walter and Kefauver demonstrate that the purpose of the jurisdictional bar
was to prevent suits by plaintiffs with little or no information.45 These statements
further illustrate that Congress did not intend for the jurisdictional bar to prevent
legitimate suits brought by honest plaintiffs.46
In the Dean case, the State of Wisconsin can hardly be characterized as a
racketeer, shyster, or a dishonest investigator. Nor was Wisconsin a plaintiff with
little or no information. It had supplied the federal government with all the infor-
mation necessary to support a claim under the FCA.47 Wisconsin's qui tam ac-
tion was a legitimate action in which Wisconsin sought to recover for a real fraud
perpetrated on the state and the federal government.4" Since the Seventh Circuit
denied a remedy for this legitimate cause of action,49 it frustrated the Congres-
sional intent of the FCA.
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS
In Dean, the Seventh Circuit relied on United States v. Aster5 ° to support its
39. H.R. Rep. No 933, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 reprinted in 89 CONG. REc. 10,845 (1943).
40. Id.
41. 89 CONG. REC. 10,846 (1943).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 10,849.
45. See id. at 10,846, 10,849.
46. Id.
47. 729 F.2d at 1104.
48. Id. at 1100.
49. See id. at 1107.
50. 275 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1960).
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application of the jurisdictional bar.5" In Aster, the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the jurisdictional bar was broad enough to include information
obtained by the government from any source.52 The Dean court also relied on the
dicta of a 1945 case, United States v. Pittman," in which the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals discussed the absoluteness of the jurisdictional bar when the govern-
ment possesses the essential information yet declines to join the suit.54
The Dean court did not consider two more recent Supreme Court cases:
United States v. Neifert- White Co. 55 and United States v. Bornstein .56 While Nei-
fert- White and Bornstein do not concern the jurisdictional bar issue, they espouse
that the FCA should be liberally construed. In Neifert- White, an agricultural
dealer who sold grain bins to farmers provided false invoices in support of a loan
application to the Commodity Credit Corporation." The Court found the dealer
liable under the FCA for submitting fraudulent claims against the government. 8
The Court favored a liberal construction of the FCA and stated: "[I]n the various
contexts in which questions of the proper construction of the Act have been
presented, the Court has consistently refused to accept a rigid, restrictive reading
... , The Court found support for this liberal construction in the FCA's leg-
islative intent. It noted: "The objective of Congress in enacting the False Claims
Act 'was broadly to protect the funds and property of the Government from
fraudulent claims, regardless of the particular form, or function, of the govern-
ment instrumentality upon which such claims were made.' "'
In 1976, the Supreme Court again refused to interpret the FCA restrictively.
In United States v. Bornstein61, a subcontractor willfully misrepresented the qual-
ity of electronic tubes to the prime contractor. The subcontractor was held liable
under the FCA for a false claim submitted to the government by the prime con-
tractor.62 Thus, the FCA was liberally construed to include indirect, fraudulent
claims of subcontractors.63
In Dean, the Seventh Circuit chose not to follow the Supreme Court's liberal
construction of the FCA. Instead, the Seventh Circuit ignored the Neifert- White
and Bornstein decisions and adopted a restrictive interpretation based upon earlier
Third and Fifth Circuit decisions.'
WISCONSIN'S STATUTORY OBLIGATION
While other circuits have recognized that the jurisdictional bar applies when
the plaintiff is the source of the information in the government's possession,65 the
facts in Dean are unique. Although Wisconsin was the source of the information
51. 729 F.2d at 1105.
52. 275 F.2d at 282, 283.
53. 151 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1945).
54. Id. at 853. The Pittman court, however, declined to apply the jurisdictional bar because the govern-
ment had joined in the suit.
55. 390 U.S. 228 (1968).
56. 423 U.S. 303 (1976).
57. 390 U.S. at 229.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 232.
60. Id. at 233, quoting Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958).
61. 423 U.S. at 303.
62. Id. at 303, 304.
63. Id.
64. See Dean, 729 F.2d at 1105, 1106.
65. The following cases have also held that the jurisdictional bar applies even if the plaintiff is the source
of the information: United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Florida 615 F.2d 1370, 1371 (5th Cir. 1980);
Pettis ex rel. United States v. Morrison-Knudsen Co. 577 F.2d 668, 669 (9th Cir. 1978); Safir v.
Blackwell 579 F.2d 742, 747 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979). However, in each of
[Vol. 12:112
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in the government's possession,6 6 Wisconsin did not voluntarily offer the informa-
tion to the government.67 Rather, the Medicare reimbursement program required
Wisconsin to provide the information to the federal government. 68 Wisconsin had
a dilemma. If it gave the information to the United States, the jurisdictional bar
as interpreted by the Dean court would prevent any recovery under the FCA.69
On the other hand, if Wisconsin withheld the information to preserve its right to
sue under the FCA, it would violate federal law under the Medicare reimburse-
ment program.7 °
Wisconsin chose to comply with federal law and provide the information to
the United States.71 In doing so, Wisconsin hoped the court would recognize its
dilemma and allow its suit despite the jurisdictional bar. 72 The district court was
sympathetic to Wisconsin's situation 73 the Seventh Circuit was not.74
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In Dean, the Seventh Circuit followed the Third and Fifth Circuits in adopting
a restrictive, literal reading of the FCA's jurisdictional bar provision.75 Granted,
a literal reading promotes predictability by enabling plaintiffs to rely on the plain
language of the statute. A literal reading, however, controverts two Supreme
Court decisions that broadly construe the FCA to allow recovery for fraud perpe-
trated on the government. 76 Moreover, reading an absolute jurisdictional bar into
the FCA frustrates its legislative intent since the United States government would
be less protected from fraudulent claims.7 7 A literal reading also frustrates the
legislative intent of the jurisdictional bar provision. The jurisdictional bar was
enacted not only to bar parasitical suits that arise from public records,78 but also
to allow legitimate suits brought by honest plaintiffs. 79 Furthermore, a literal
reading neglects to consider any mitigating or equitable factors, such as Wiscon-
sin's predicament in which federal medicaid law required Wisconsin to provide
the information to the United States.8 °
The Dean court did, however, recognize the inequity of a literal interpreta-
tion.8 The court suggested that Wisconsin petition Congress to create an excep-
tion to the jurisdictional bar.82 The court stated: "If the State of Wisconsin
desires a special exemption to the False Claims Act because of its requirement to
report Medicaid fraud to the Federal Government, then it should ask Congress to
these cases, the plaintiff was not required by law to provide the essential information to the Govern-
ment, as Wisconsin was required to disclose in Dean. See supra note 19.
66. 729 F.2d at 1104.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1976). Since the United States would have possession of the information upon
which the suit was based, the jurisdictional bar would prevent either Wisconsin or the United States
from recovering under the False Claims Act despite the fraud perpetrated on the state and federal
governments. Consequently, Wisconsin would have to pursue a remedy in state court and the United
States would have to search for a different act under which to recover - assuming one is available.
70. See 42 C.F.R. § 455.17 (1984) supra note 21.
71. 729 F.2d at 1104.
72. See id. at 1101, 1106.
73. See id. at 1103.
74. See id. at 1106.
75. Id. at 1105, 1106.
76. See Neifert-White 390 U.S. at 232 and Bornstein 423 U.S. at 303, 304.
77. 390 U.S. at 233.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 30-3 1.
79: See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22 and 65-74.
81. 729 F.2d at 1105, 1106.
82. Id. at 1106, 1107.
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provide the exemption. ''13
In order to provide an equitable solution to cases like Dean, Congress should
amend the FCA's jurisdictional bar provision to exempt plaintiffs who are re-
quired to report the essential information to the Federal Government. Such an
amendment would enable plaintiffs to rely on the plain language of the statute,
rather than guessing whether the court will broadly construe the FCA. This
amendment would also be consistent with the legislative intent of the jurisdic-
tional bar provision. It would allow honest plaintiffs, like Wisconsin, to recover
while still barring parasitical suits brought by racketeers and dishonest plaintiffs.8 4
Most importantly, because fewer plaintiffs would fall within the jurisdictional bar,
this amendment would further the original purpose of the False Claims Act: to
protect the United States Government from fraudulent claims.85
PROPOSED AMENDMENT
This comment proposes an amendment to the jurisdictional bar of the FCA:
The court shall have no jurisdiction to proceed with any such suit brought
under clause (B) of this section or pending suit brought under this section
whenever it shall be made to appear that such suit was based upon evidence or
information in the possession of the United States, or any agency, officer, or
employee thereof, at the time such suit was brought, unless the plaintiff was the
source of such evidence or information and was required by federal law to pro-
vide such evidence or information to the United States, or any agency, officer, or
employee thereof.
(Italicized portion indicates author's proposed amendment to § 232(C).)
This amendment would enable plaintiffs and courts to rely on the plain lan-
guage of the statute, thereby promoting predictability. With this amendment,
even a literal interpretation would not controvert the legislative intent of the juris-
dictional bar. Presently, the jurisdictional bar provision of the FCA is overbroad
because it bars suits by plaintiffs, like the State of Wisconsin, who are required to
turn information over to the Federal Government. The proposed amendment
eliminates the overbreadth problem by allowing recovery for plaintiffs who are
required by federal law to provide the information to the United States govern-
ment. Unless Congress acts to amend the jurisdictional bar of the FCA, plaintiffs,
like Wisconsin, will lose an otherwise valid cause of action because they complied
with federal law and submitted essential information to the federal government.
Furthermore, without this amendment, the United States would not be adequately




84. See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
85. 390 U.S. at 233.
* B.A., Northwestern University, 1982; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1985.
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